Why Equivocal Concepts Don't Make the Thomist Cut

As our prior post went over, St. Thomas has plenty of reasons to take the position that univocal concepts and terms are not properly predicated of God and of creation. He also rejects the opposite extreme, that is, that terms predicated of both God and creation are entirely equivocal. St. Thomas likewise has reason for these.

Equivocation exists when only the term, name, or word (and not the concept behind it) is common. So the concepts are different, though the terms are the same. Thus the term "Big dog" (really Canis major) can mean both a constellation and a big canine, such as perhaps an Bull Mastiff. Other than the imaginative ascription to the constellation to dog-like shape, there is no conceptual relationship between the two uses of the word Canis major.

Canis Major (Big Dog) Used Equivocally as a Constellation and a Pet

St. Thomas Aquinas's reasons for rejection equivocation include:

• If our terms were all equivocal when speaking of God and of creatures, we would have utterly no knowledge of God whatsoever through creation. Any reference to God extrapolating from things known in creation would be fallacious: they would suffer from the fallacia aequivocationis, the equivocational fallacy. The boy is bright. Things on fire are bright. Therefore the boy is on fire.
• Equivocation works in a sense both ways. Not only would we be unable to travel from the knowledge of creatures to a knowledge of God, but the likeness of creation to its Maker--man as the imago Dei and the the cosmos as vestigia Dei--would have to be abandoned. If there is no likeness, then it must be because there is no causal connection between God and the world, which be tantamount to saying that the world does not exist.
• If there is no link between God's essence (and the knowledge of his essence, from which the idea or ratio of the world is to be found) and the world, then God's knowledge of his essence would not yield creation, and so it follows that God would have no knowledge of the world.
  

Clearly, taking the position that nothing can be said about the world and God except equivocally means to separate God from the world and the world from God. God is a stranger, and we would all be agnostics, at best.

Why Univocal Concepts Don't Make the Thomist Cut

For St. Thomas Aquinas, univocal terms or concepts simply are incapable of communicating to us things concerning God as the creator of heaven and earth, of all that is seen or unseen. St. Thomas provides us many reasons why this is so. We shall enumerate those reasons, but first we shall begin with St. Thomas's definition of a univocal concept.

For St. Thomas, a univocal concept is a concept that unambiguously and accurately comprehends the various objects defined by that concept, i.e., adequately defines and distinguishes the various instantiations of that concept. The conventional term that is given to that concept may or may not be univocal, but the concept underlying it is, and so can be said to apply in the same way and in the same manner without distinction by two or more objects that share in that concept. Take, for example, the word "bat." The word "bat" elicits for us the concept of a flying mammal of the order Chiroptera.* As a concept, "bat" is univocal when applied to such mammals. We can say, for example, that the concept "bat" includes Townsend's big-eared bat (Corynorhinus townsendii) and Rafinesque's big-eared bat (Corynorhinus rafinesquii). We recognize that the bats belong to the same genus (coryonrhinus) though they are different species.

Univocally Bats
Townsend's big-eared Bat and Rafinesque's big-eared Bat
Corynorhinus townsendii and Corynorhinus rafinesquii

We can further particularize so that the concept we have of "Townsend's big-eared bat" can be univocally applied so as to include unambiguously two instantiations of this specific kind of bat. So if we are dubiously fortunate to stumble across a colony of Townsend's big-eared bats in some cave, we will recognize each individual bat as univocally belonging to the concept of "Townsend's big-eared bat."

A Colony of Townsend's big-eared bats

"A univocal term is not merely a common designation, it also states that what is said univocally of two objects is possessed in the same way by both. Univocation implies, in other words, not only logical [intellectual, conceptual] but also metaphysical univocation." Lyttkens, 200. This is an important aspect of univocity. Univocity can refer to "terms," to intellectual "concepts," and to metaphysical realities, that is, the reality of things and how they exist, their "to be" or esse.

That is why univocal concepts, and certainly univocal metaphysical realities, cannot be applied to both God and creation. The "concept" of God is not univocal to the "concept" we have of any creature. The metaphysical reality--the "to be" or esse of God is not univocal with the "to be" or esse of creation. God and creation cannot be put together into a common univocal concept like one species of bat can with another species under a genus.

St. Thomas gives a number of reasons why univocal concepts cannot be predicated of God.**

• Univocity between creation and God is ruled out by the causal relation between God and His creation. In creation, the form of the effect (the cosmos) is not like its cause. What in God is one and simply and uncontingent (uncreated being or esse) is received by creation in a divided, particularized, contingent, and multiplicitous form (created being). For univocity to exist, the cause and effect must not be unlike.
  
• Univocity is ruled out because the mode of existence (modus essendi) between God and creation is not the same. The mode of existence is different between God and creation. Whereas God's essence (His "what") and existence (His "is" or "to be") are one and the same, in creatures there is a distinction between essence (the "what" of a creature) and its existence (the "to be" of a creature). God's essence is necessary existence ("I am who am"). The creature's essence is contingent existence. Therefore God and creature cannot be univocally related.
• For something to be univocal in concept means that there is "something existing in the same manner in several things." Lyttkens, 201. (These several things are called the univocata, those things which share in the univocal concept.) In other words, there must be something that may be jointly and similarly predicated or said of the univocalia--whether it be something related to genus, differentia with the genus, i.e., species, differentia within the species, properties of a species, or even accidents arising out of differentia numerica or different instantiations or individuations of a certain species, e.g., one man versus another man.*** However, there is no way that anything predicated of any created thing may be predicated univocally of God. God and creation are not univocata.
  
• Another reason given by St. Thomas is a bit more subtle. In an intellectual sense (secundum intellectum) things of which something may be said univocally are not completely unitary. But God is both in an intellectual or logical sense (secundum intellectum) and in the ontological sense (secundum rem) simple. Therefore, God and creation cannot be univocally related to each other.
• The univocal concepts obtained from abstraction of the various individuals (e.g., the concept of "bat" that man abstracts from his observation of a number of individual bats) has a quality that arises from such a concept, specifically, any particular instantiation of that concept is one of composition or one that is compound. Any particular bat may be said to be constituted of the concept bat + its individuation. No one bat has "batness" full and entire. For this reason, the concept of "bat" is simpler than the actual bat itself. Ontologically speaking (secundum rem), a bat is a compound of the universal plus the particular expression of that universal. However, God is absolutely simple, and there is no compound in Him. God is secundum intellectum and secundum rem the same and simple. "God is absolutely 'simple' (simplex)." Lyttkens, 202. Composition is something found only in the material world (composition of act and potentiality), whereas God is absolutely simple and not subject to composition (since He is pure act).
• The relation of creation to God the Creator precludes univocation of the two for another reason. This reason requires us to come to terms with the notion of "per prius et posterius." The words literally mean in a prior or posterior manner, but it appears to be shorthand for the notion that a concept may be applied to two objects, one in an absolute sense and to another in a relative, lesser sense, so that what is said "per prius" is said of the prime analogate in an absolute prior, total, superior, or more noble sense, and is said of the secondary analogate or analogates "per posterius" or in a relatively posterior, partial, inferior, or ignoble sense relative to the prime analogate. Rocca (2004), 137. Words that are used in such a manner--per prius et posterius--are not used univocally. To say something per prius et posterius is not to put the cart before the horse. However, to say something per poserius et prius would be to place the less important before the more important. A relationship of per prius et posterius applies when the lesser participates in the greater. Accordingly, the relationship between substances and accidents is one of per prior et posterius because accidents require the substance to exist and so participate in the substance. "Nothing can be said of God and [created] things in the same order, all must be said per prius et posterius. For all that is state of God is stated essentially, but of [created] things it is stated by participation. Univocal predication is therefore excluded." Lyttkens (1953), 203. God and his properties are one, and he possesses them absolutely. Contingent creatures are not so, their properties are distinct from their substance, and they do not possess their properties absolutely.
• In two things of which univocal concepts can be predicated, there is a commonality of essence, but not a commonality of existence (their "to be" or esse is distinct from their essence, which they share). Univocity does not include esse or the "to be" which is existentially different for every creature, and the distinction between essentia and esse allows for univocal concepts to be applied to more than one instantiation of that concept. However, in God the esse or "to be" of God is equivalent to his essence of essentia, and so univocity is precluded by the commonality of existence and essence.

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*As a term, the word "bat" is equivocal in that it, among other things, it can mean a flying mammal of the order Chiroptera or an instrument with which to hit a ball. The various concepts of "bat" referred to by the equivocal term "bat," however, are univocal.
**These are summarized from the discussion in Lyttkens (1953), 200-04.
***These terms are scholastic terms referred to as the five predicabilia, or five things that may be predicated or said about a subject. They are genus, species, differentia, propium, and accidens. They are in decreasing order of generality. Thus, for man, his genus is "animal," his species is "homo sapiens" or "man," one of his differentia specifica may be his power of thought, a property of man is risibility or ability to laugh (a propium). Accidents are "a more occasional property varying from one individual to another," Lyttkens, 201 n. 7, in other words those arising from differentia numerica, and might include such things as one man being "black" and another being "white."

Why St. Thomas Needs Analogy

There are at least two reasons why St. Thomas Aquinas adopts analogical thinking, and they have to do with his metaphysics. The first relates to St. Thomas Aquinas's view of being. Being (esse = "to be") is a transcendental shared among all things that exist bar none. All things share in being, but in different ways since there is not only being in which they share, but there are clearly separate beings that share in being. So there must be some way for St. Thomas to handle this unity and diversity. As Hampus Lyttkens explains the situation:

As being is varied in many different ways, but is nevertheless common to all things, [St. Thomas] had to find a formula expressing both what is common and what is different [among beings]. In adopting analogy for this purpose, Aquinas follows the tradition that had substituted analogy for the Aristotelian πρὸς ἓν concept.

Lyttkens, 199.

But this is only one reason and one kind of analogy. St. Thomas also had to find another sort of analogical thinking that related to his theology, in particular one dealing with his understanding of how man acquired his knowledge (his epistemology, which is moderate realism, and in which man's knowledge comes to him from his senses out of which he abstracts concepts, essences of things). If man is to know God, he will know God only through concepts abstracted from the knowledge he has gained through his senses.* St. Thomas has to adopt analogical thinking because if he used the concepts reason had abstracted from the visible world univocally of God, it would make God something completely knowable, and God's transcendence from the world would be threatened. On the other hand, if concepts gained from the visible world were only usable equivocally with respect to God, they would have no meaning for us, and God would be unknown and unknowable. We could have to confess ignorance, and we would remain all agnostics. Using analogical thinking allowed St. Thomas to steer the course between a God that was unlike his creation to a God that was like his creation and so understand God as both immanent and transcendent, a God both unlike and yet like his creation.

Lyttken explains:

[For St. Thomas] there is some connexion between God and the world. The creation is regarded as an effect of God preexisting in Him and both intellectually and naturally, and accordingly resembling God in some way. God's knowledge of His creation is based on His essence being in various ways imitated by creation. But the likeness of the things to God is also a prerequisite of man's knowledge of God.

Aquinas must no make neither too much, nor too little, of this likeness of creation to God. If that likeness is made to distant, or is denied, the gap between God and the world cannot be bridged. God would then be a stranger to his creation, as His knowledge of this is contingent on its being like Himself. Man, on his part, could never have any knoweldge of God, and his road to salvation would then be closed. And that is not all. The whole object of creation--to glorify God and return to Him as its highest good--would be lost. The very existence of creation would then be problematical, as it must in any case be like its creator in that it is being. . . . .

Too great a likeness of creation to God would, on the other hand, threaten the sovereignty and transcendence of God. Man would then be able to acquire immediate and direct knowledge of the divine. Revelation and salvation would be unnecessary. The ultimate consequence would be a pantheism obliterating the boundaries between God and His works, between God and man.

In this situation analogy becomes the formula which is the mean of two extremes. It states that the creation is both like and unlike God. . . . . [Aquinas] rejects both extremes by stating that quite univocal or quite multivocal [equivocal] statements with reference to God are excluded, seeing that--as our concepts are taken from creation--this would mean that creation would either be on a part with, or absolutely unlike God. . . .

We don't want to make God and the world equivalent. Nor do we want to make God and the world strangers. We want to make God creator, the world created, and we want to know God, as St. Paul says, "for the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable." (Romans 1:20). Let us not be inexcusable. Let us adopt analogical thinking of God so that we may "from the creation of the world," fathom the "invisible things" of God, "his eternal power . . . and divinity."

Analogy is the way to avoid error, but, more, it is the way to know, as best as we are able by our lights until we reach the state of the blessed, God. And by knowing Him, we learn to love Him.

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*Even Scripture uses material things or relations to describe God. The need for analogy is not limited to man's natural knowledge of God attained through the use of reason. It is required to understand the very concepts that the Scriptures use to describe God. When God is described as a rock, or a shield, or a horn of salvation (2 Sam. 22:3), these terms are obviously not used univocally of God. Nor are they used equivocally of God or we would not understand them as telling us anything. They are used analogically.

Analogy of Attribution

We have posted before on Aristotle's pros hen analogy or the analogy of attribution.* We want to spend some time developing this particular analogy. "This analogy may be called the predicative analogy par excellence." Anderson (1967), 15. The analogy of attribution is the "predication of a term, which is univocal in itself, of other things through some causal relation involved." Id. When predicated of other things, the term is used not univocally, but analogically or porportionately with reference to the term's univocal sense.

In understanding this analogy of attribution, we need to understand some additional concepts. Specifically, we need to understand the concept of "prime analogate" and "secondary analogate." The "prime analogate" is the principal term to which the "secondary analogates" refer for their meaning. The "secondary analogates" are predicated of something, but reference the "primary analogate," and so the former participate in an imperfect, imprecise, or limited way as a result of a relationship, usually causal,** with the primary analogate. The "secondary analogates" have meaning only by reference to the "primary analogate."

This kind of analogical predication, then, is in effect when the selfsame word is said of different things according to a notion that is univocally the same as regards the primary analogate but proportionally varied in respect to the relations wherein the other analogates stand to it. It is therefore clear that the principal property of this analogy is that the notion attributed to a number of entities is realized intrinsically in the prime analogate alone, the other analogates receiving the common name only be extrinsic reference or denomination from it.

Anderson (1967), 15. The prime analogate realizes in its full sense the concept or notion that is attributed in a lesser, different, or less perfect sense to the secondary analogates as a result of their relationship to the principle analogate. The term that is used analogically is univocal when used of the primary analogate itself, but is applied analogically to the secondary analogates. There is always one primary analogate, although there may be more than one secondary analogate. But these secondary analogates in each and ever instance would all refer to the prime analogate. "In a pithy formula it is said that the Analogy of Attribution is always that of one or several to one." For this reason, the analogy is "rightly called analogy of attribution, because it always involves attribution to a single term." Anderson (1949), 94. The secondary analogate is (or the secondary analogates are) related to the primary analogate.

As St. Thomas Aquinas describes this particular analogy, the secondary analogates all refer identically to the same thing, but from the perspective of their relations to the prime analogate. Each term in the secondary analogate is understood "according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing," namely, the primary analogate. Or, as Anderson puts it, the term as used in the secondary analogate "is referred to that one thing [the primary analogate] according to its relations to it."*** Indeed, this feature is what gives the "essential 'notes'" of this analogy: "diversity in relations; identity of the term of those relations." Anderson (1949), 96.

Things are analogous in this way because they are proportioned to one thing: proportionantur ad unum. In other words, things are analogous by analogy of proportion or attribution whose name is common, the notion signified by that name being the same as regards the term of attribution but diverse as regards the relations of the analogates to it.

Anderson (1949), 96 (quoting XI Meta. 2917).

A frequent example is the term "healthy." It is derived directly from Aristotle's example used in his Metaphysics, 1003a-31b. Used in its principal, intrinsic sense, an animal is "healthy" if it conforms to its nature. A dog may therefore be said to be "healthy." In this sense, "healthy" is a univocal term that refers to conformity with nature. It would be the prime analogate.

A dog's food may also be said to be "healthy," as well as a certain kind of medicine may be said to be "healthy," or a dog's urine may be said to be "healthy." The dog's "healthy" food, its "healthy" medicine, and its "healthy" urine ("healthy" in these instances being secondary analogates) all refer to, and obtain their meaning from, the prime analogate "healthy" as used of the dog. The healthy food is a cause of the healthy dog. The healthy medicine may be the cause of making a sick dog healthy again. The healthy urine is a sign of the healthy dog. The term "healthy" is realized intrinsically in the reference to the healthy dog. But the term food, medicine, and urine receive the term healthy only by extrinsic reference to, or denomination from, the term healthy as used of the dog.

The analogy of attribution is not only used with adjectival qualities or attributions. It is also seen in the relationship between substance and accidents. The accidents relating to substances are said to be, but they are said to be only an an analogous sense because their "to be" relates to the substance of which they are accidents. The accidents would not have a to be were it not that they all refer to the the to be of the substance.

The analogy of attribution may be applied to the relationship between man and God so that terms, univocal as to God as the primary analogate, may be said of man as the secondary analogate analogously by relationship of exemplary (extrinsic formal) cause. So a man may be said to be a "good" man, though strictly speaking, none is good but God alone (Mark 10:18), inasmuch as the term "good" is predicated of man analogously in reference (as extrinsic formal cause of all goodness, including the "good" man) to God, who alone is univocally good. Anderson (1949), 96.
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*It is also less commonly known as analogy of proportion. Anderson (1949), 96.
**Since the relationship of the secondary analogates to the primary analogate is usual causal, it can be a relationship arising from a material cause, formal cause (including exemplary cause, i.e., extrinsic formal cause), efficient cause, or final cause. Anderson (1949), 96.
***St. Thomas, Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7, 535-36.

535. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur.

536. Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. Et hoc patet in exemplis infra positis.

535. He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said “to be predicated analogously,” i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.

536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.

See Anderson (1949), 93-94.

Analogy of Inequality in Theology

As we have seen in our prior posting, the analogy of inequality--while it plays an important role in science and logic--is a poor carrier of metaphysics. It is a porter that can carry essences and natures, but it cannot carry the heavy weight of being. It is a carrier of universals, but not a carrier of transcendentals. Using the analogy of inequality in metaphysics leads one to the shipwreck of Spinozism, of monism, of confusing a univocal concept (essence/nature), and a mental and abstractive one at that, with what should be an analogical concept (being). Being ought not to be so tamed. It leaves one's metaphysics like it leaves the wild animal in a cage, listless, unhappy, pining for the boundless freedom of the African Savannah.

The analogy of inequality also presents problems in theology if misapplied. If certain terms are understood univocally, it can lead to anthropomorphisms. It is a mistake to extend out, protract, expand univocal concepts in this manner. The "way of increase" or via augmenti wherein univocal concepts are indefinitely expanded does not change the fact that they are nothing but extensions "in the same line, of created or creaturely values thought of homogeneously or univocally." Ultimately, it is to make God into an idol, even if it is an idol of the mind. But to fashion God into a clay or wooden idol is only slightly less a violation of the First Commandment than fashioning God into a mental or conceptual idol. Si comprehendis non est Deus, whether God is comprehended in wood or stone, or comprehended by human mental concept. Even if the most precious metal is used to carve an idol, an idol is an idol is an idol. Likewise, even if the most precious of mental concepts is used to describe God (being understood univocally, say by being crammed into the box of essence through an analogy of inequality) it is an idol. To make God nothing other than an augmented man is folly.

It is senseless to suppose that by expanding indefinitely our initial, univocal concepts we shall in the end arrive at a knowledge of God in the sense of a self-subsistent Being. Such a pseudo-physical kind of thinking would make of metaphysics and theology a quantitative science. . . . This presents us with the structure of Analogy of Inequality--a kind of thinking that inevitably results in anthropomorphism," which consists essentially in the attempt to conceive of the uncreated as homogeneous with the created, recognizing between these two orders only a distinction of degree.

Anderson (1967), 13.

No, God is not an "infinite" man. God is not "infinite" Reason (if by Reason we mean our univocal "concept" of Reason). God is not "infinite" Truth (if by Truth we mean our univocal "concept" of Truth). God is not "infinite" Being (if by Being we mean a univocal "concept" of Being). No, no, no, no. God and man do not differ only in degree, God and man differ in kind. God's being and man's being--and indeed the being of the cosmos--differ not in degree, but in kind. There is a chasm between the Being of God--Esse Ipsum Subsistens--and the being of man, between something in pure Act, and something in Potentiality. The chasm is not an entirely unsurpassable chasm, even by human reason, but certainly one unsurpassable by an analogy of inequality. (It certainly can be surpassed by God--אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה--in revelation,* especially in the revelation of God in Man in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν) and by man in a responsive obedience of faith to the grace thus freely offered by the God with a most generous Love. But we are talking here of man's natural capacities to surpass this chasm, not of man's supernatural obediential potency.)

No. To have any hope at bridging the chasm between the Being of God and being as we know it, we have to access another analogy. We have to leave the way of analogy of inequality into the way of analogy of being. We have to leave the way of univocal ideas into the way of the analogical. The univocal "'way' must give place to the 'way of being,' which alone leads out of the realm of the univocal into that of the analogical." Anderson (1967), 13.

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*Exodus 3:14 (Ehyeh asher ehyeh), I am who am.

Boxing Up Being

It is a mistake to build a metaphysics upon the concepts of our mind of certain beings--essences or natures--rather than being. It seizes upon the lesser, the universals, and forgets the greater, the transcendentals. Plato, of course, idealized the concepts in the mind which were abstracted from observations obtained through sensory experience. Therefore, for Plato, the concept of elephant in the human mind was but a shadow of the ideal elephant, an ideal elephant which was a real existence outside the mind. This was a wrong step, corrected by Aristotle.

While the mental concepts we have in our mind are valuable--they are the kith and kin, the warp and woof of much of our thinking--they are not the sorts of things we ought to be building our metaphysics on, though they are just fine for building our science or our logic upon. However, to build a metaphysics upon these universals, these univocal mental concepts, is to confuse epistemology with ontology, the study of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη or epistēmē) with the study of being (τὸ ὄν, the to on, that which is, the being thing, or οὐσία, ousia, or being). Worse, it may lead us into some sort of Spinozism, a pantheism, a panentheism, or panousianism.

Metaphysics ought to be built not on those concepts with which logic and science plays, but upon being "according to its own presence" upon the "intelligibilities existing in beings," not those concepts existing in the mind. It should be occupied with inherent being, not being as known, not things as signified, but things as things. Anderson (1967), 9-10. Metaphysics tries to get outside the subjective conceptual knowledge of being to the very objective reality of being. Someone who plays with essences or natures to try to build a metaphysics is like an architect desiring to build a skyscraper with children's blocks. It just cannot be done. It is a mistake to try.

Building upon essences or natures instead of being is not solved by "metaphysicizing" the concept of essence or nature. Even classifying or abstracting the essence or nature of being does not solve the problem, but exacerbates it by disguising it. To think that essentializing or naturalizing being does being any good is as if one were to believe that one has done a lion good by trapping him and putting him in a cage. One ought not to tame a transcendental by making it into a universal. Neither, however, should one try to make universal into a transcendental. To ennoble a univocal concept (essence or nature) in this manner does not change the underlying univocality of the concept, any more than dubbing a cad a knight makes him less than a cad. Sir Mick Jagger was no better a man than Mr. Mick Jagger. Sir Elton John was every bit as much a bugger as Mr. Elton John.

The problem of categorizing being as an essence or nature should be at once apparent. Since essences or natures are abstractions or mental concepts, and univocal ones at that, the participation by individuals in abstractions or mental concepts is strictly logical, mental, not something real or ontological. "The quidditative commonness founding this sort of participation is formally logical in character." Anderson (1967), 10. As Anderson summarizes it:

[I]n an ontology of the kind described [where transcendentals are essentialized or naturalized], these principles or terms [transcendentals, which "stand for no such univocally predicable formality"] are necessarily conceived of as univocal universals. Only essences taken out of their existential contexts can be conceived of univocally. An essentialist sort of participation is rightly understood to be basically "univocal" because it implies a community of essence among the things participating and the things participated. But that which is common essentially does not exist actually but only abstractly or logically as common.

Anderson (1967), 10-11. There is a huge divide between what is essentially common and what is existentially common.

An effort to remove the mental, abstractive aspect of essences or natures may be tried through some sort of idealiziation or realization of these essences or natures. But this is not a way out of the original mistake of making being an essence. You might be able to take the girl out of the country, but you can't take the country out of the girl. You cannot take the univocality involved in essence and nature simply by transcendentalizing that essence or nature (e.g. by making the essence or nature of "being" the supreme ideal or supreme form) just like you do not help things by taking the transcendental being and stuffing it in a univocal cage of essence or nature.

No. The transcendentals must remain wild and free, as it were. Being in particular is not to be restrained in univocal chains, even if those chains are called analogy of inequality. Being must be allowed to live the life it was meant to, to live a life of analogy not in name, but in reality. Our participation in being is not a participation in a common essence or nature, an essential participation, one in the mind or logic, but is a participation in a common existence, it is an existential participation, a real "most actual and causal" reality. Anderson (1967), 12.

To force being into the confines of a univocal concept leads to monism or Spinozism. This is because "the mode of predication follows the mode of being." So if we have forced being into a univocal box, then everything we predicate it with becomes univocal. So being all of a sudden becomes univocal, and there becomes only one reality--Being--in which all participate, so that there is a vast monism, a pantheism, for there is no way--being having been captured and put in a univocal box--to avoid equating the Being of God or the Supreme Reality with the Being of any other created thing. Being will then be said of both God and creature univocally, and there is no distinction between God and the cosmos. Voilà: God has become the world and the world has become God. And we have abandoned in one fell swoop, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Isaiah, Elijah, and Christ.

This is the curse of systems of metaphysics built on the analogy of inequality:

Systems that do not recognize the Analogy of Being in the sense meant* [but are built upon an Analogy of Inequality] are (if they admit plurality at all) characterized by the unequal sharing of all putative things in a single univocal Reality, Substance, Absolute, Nature, Idea.

Anderson (1967), 12.

Anathema sit!
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*As we shall see, the Analogy of Being, which is an "intrinsic proportional sharing of things in existential act," is built upon an analogy entirely separate and distinct from the analogy of inequality.

Analogy of Inequality: At Heart Univocal

The analogy of inequality is common in the natural or physical sciences, nay, even in our every day life, as it is found "wherever there are homogeneous notions realized variously in distinct things." Anderson (1967), 5. From neutrons, to water molecules, to spores, to walnuts, to saplings, to worms and the bass that feed on them, to condors, to elephants, to Watusis . . . the very assumptions of empiricism and the science built upon it begin with the individual and from it mentally extracts or abstracts sort of univocal mental concept, a nature, a form, a commonality which it uses in its analysis, its verifications, its measurements. "The universals conceived in such sciences, being derived from the physical composites with which they deal, are necessarily relative to them."

The abstraction pulls out, distills, as it were, the univocal μορφή, the morphē or form, from the hylomorphic individuals. This necessarily means that one can never abstract beyond the hylomorphic dimension. One does not enjoy any "leap in being" using the analogy of inequality, since what occurs is the result of abstraction of particulars into a univocal concept to which we attach a term. So we see individual African elephants, instantiations of African elephants, and we abstract from our perception of these African elephants a univocal mental concept of "elephant"-a large, gray mammal with wrinkled skin, tusks, large ears, and a trunk. And to this concept we attach a conventional name--elephant if we are English, ٱلۡفِيلِ if Arabic, ndovu if Kikuyu, слон if we are Russian, or, if we happen to be a scientist, Loxodonta africana.

All empirical knowledge therefore remains at root and at limb, physical, univocal; it remains tied down to the generic and categorical. This sort of knowledge is never able to reach out beyond the physical into the metaphysical, beyond the generic or categorical into the "supra-generic or supra-categorical." These univocal notions--nature, forms, concepts--are never independent of the matter from which they are abstracted, and never lead to the realm of the transcendentals. Anderson (1967), 6.* They never leave the "being-in-knowledge" to get to the "being-in-itself." Id. 7.

Universals, which is what the univocal notions of essence or nature are, are very different from Transcendentals. The universal of "elephant," that is to say the concept of "elephant" we have in our mind abstracted from the individual elephants we have perceived, is different from the transcendental "being" or "good" which is abstracted from every thing that we have perceived. The universal elephant is generic (mammal), and specific (elephant). "Since the concepts used are generic and specific, they are, like all class-notions, radically and rudimentarily univocal." Anderson (1967), 7.

There is perhaps a taint or wisp of analogy when it comes to the analogy of inequality, and for this reason it has been called an analogy, though it remains an analogy secundum quid, not analogy simpliciter. It is called analogy by courtesy, not by right. The individual instantiations of the concept are not entirely equivalent to the univocal concept, and to the extent there is this slight individual difference in conceptual sameness there is a part of analogical component in the analogy of inequality which justifies its name.

The analogy of inequality is not the analogy upon which we ought to build our metaphysics. A metaphysics (such as Plato's) that is built upon essences or natures (i.e., universals) and their intelligibility rather than existence or being is problematic, as we shall next explore.

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*As Anderson (1967) observes, there are some transcendental features ("certain transcendentality") in the some of the categories (e.g., quantity, quality, relation, time), but these immediately lose their transcendental quality when applied to diverse existential realizations. Weight considered abstractly has a certain transcendental quality, but it immediately becomes mundane when we speak of the weight of Abul Abbas, the elephant given to Charlemagne, Hanno, Pope Leo X's pet elephant, or Jumbo, P. T. Barnum's elephant. Anderson concludes: "We mean that univocity, properly speaking, is a property only of conceptual wholes signifying essences in abstraction from all existential diversity. Thus, while in a sense analogical unities can exist within categories, the latter, considered as such, are formally univocal." Anderson (1967), 6-7.