We have posted before on Aristotle's pros hen analogy or the analogy of attribution.* We want to spend some time developing this particular analogy. "This analogy may be called the predicative analogy par excellence." Anderson (1967), 15. The analogy of attribution is the "predication of a term, which is univocal in itself, of other things through some causal relation involved." Id. When predicated of other things, the term is used not univocally, but analogically or porportionately with reference to the term's univocal sense.
In understanding this analogy of attribution, we need to understand some additional concepts. Specifically, we need to understand the concept of "prime analogate" and "secondary analogate." The "prime analogate" is the principal term to which the "secondary analogates" refer for their meaning. The "secondary analogates" are predicated of something, but reference the "primary analogate," and so the former participate in an imperfect, imprecise, or limited way as a result of a relationship, usually causal,** with the primary analogate. The "secondary analogates" have meaning only by reference to the "primary analogate."
As St. Thomas Aquinas describes this particular analogy, the secondary analogates all refer identically to the same thing, but from the perspective of their relations to the prime analogate. Each term in the secondary analogate is understood "according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing," namely, the primary analogate. Or, as Anderson puts it, the term as used in the secondary analogate "is referred to that one thing [the primary analogate] according to its relations to it."*** Indeed, this feature is what gives the "essential 'notes'" of this analogy: "diversity in relations; identity of the term of those relations." Anderson (1949), 96.
A frequent example is the term "healthy." It is derived directly from Aristotle's example used in his Metaphysics, 1003a-31b. Used in its principal, intrinsic sense, an animal is "healthy" if it conforms to its nature. A dog may therefore be said to be "healthy." In this sense, "healthy" is a univocal term that refers to conformity with nature. It would be the prime analogate.
A dog's food may also be said to be "healthy," as well as a certain kind of medicine may be said to be "healthy," or a dog's urine may be said to be "healthy." The dog's "healthy" food, its "healthy" medicine, and its "healthy" urine ("healthy" in these instances being secondary analogates) all refer to, and obtain their meaning from, the prime analogate "healthy" as used of the dog. The healthy food is a cause of the healthy dog. The healthy medicine may be the cause of making a sick dog healthy again. The healthy urine is a sign of the healthy dog. The term "healthy" is realized intrinsically in the reference to the healthy dog. But the term food, medicine, and urine receive the term healthy only by extrinsic reference to, or denomination from, the term healthy as used of the dog.
The analogy of attribution is not only used with adjectival qualities or attributions. It is also seen in the relationship between substance and accidents. The accidents relating to substances are said to be, but they are said to be only an an analogous sense because their "to be" relates to the substance of which they are accidents. The accidents would not have a to be were it not that they all refer to the the to be of the substance.
The analogy of attribution may be applied to the relationship between man and God so that terms, univocal as to God as the primary analogate, may be said of man as the secondary analogate analogously by relationship of exemplary (extrinsic formal) cause. So a man may be said to be a "good" man, though strictly speaking, none is good but God alone (Mark 10:18), inasmuch as the term "good" is predicated of man analogously in reference (as extrinsic formal cause of all goodness, including the "good" man) to God, who alone is univocally good. Anderson (1949), 96.
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*It is also less commonly known as analogy of proportion. Anderson (1949), 96.
**Since the relationship of the secondary analogates to the primary analogate is usual causal, it can be a relationship arising from a material cause, formal cause (including exemplary cause, i.e., extrinsic formal cause), efficient cause, or final cause. Anderson (1949), 96.
***St. Thomas, Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7, 535-36.
In understanding this analogy of attribution, we need to understand some additional concepts. Specifically, we need to understand the concept of "prime analogate" and "secondary analogate." The "prime analogate" is the principal term to which the "secondary analogates" refer for their meaning. The "secondary analogates" are predicated of something, but reference the "primary analogate," and so the former participate in an imperfect, imprecise, or limited way as a result of a relationship, usually causal,** with the primary analogate. The "secondary analogates" have meaning only by reference to the "primary analogate."
This kind of analogical predication, then, is in effect when the selfsame word is said of different things according to a notion that is univocally the same as regards the primary analogate but proportionally varied in respect to the relations wherein the other analogates stand to it. It is therefore clear that the principal property of this analogy is that the notion attributed to a number of entities is realized intrinsically in the prime analogate alone, the other analogates receiving the common name only be extrinsic reference or denomination from it.Anderson (1967), 15. The prime analogate realizes in its full sense the concept or notion that is attributed in a lesser, different, or less perfect sense to the secondary analogates as a result of their relationship to the principle analogate. The term that is used analogically is univocal when used of the primary analogate itself, but is applied analogically to the secondary analogates. There is always one primary analogate, although there may be more than one secondary analogate. But these secondary analogates in each and ever instance would all refer to the prime analogate. "In a pithy formula it is said that the Analogy of Attribution is always that of one or several to one." For this reason, the analogy is "rightly called analogy of attribution, because it always involves attribution to a single term." Anderson (1949), 94. The secondary analogate is (or the secondary analogates are) related to the primary analogate.
As St. Thomas Aquinas describes this particular analogy, the secondary analogates all refer identically to the same thing, but from the perspective of their relations to the prime analogate. Each term in the secondary analogate is understood "according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing," namely, the primary analogate. Or, as Anderson puts it, the term as used in the secondary analogate "is referred to that one thing [the primary analogate] according to its relations to it."*** Indeed, this feature is what gives the "essential 'notes'" of this analogy: "diversity in relations; identity of the term of those relations." Anderson (1949), 96.
Things are analogous in this way because they are proportioned to one thing: proportionantur ad unum. In other words, things are analogous by analogy of proportion or attribution whose name is common, the notion signified by that name being the same as regards the term of attribution but diverse as regards the relations of the analogates to it.Anderson (1949), 96 (quoting XI Meta. 2917).
A frequent example is the term "healthy." It is derived directly from Aristotle's example used in his Metaphysics, 1003a-31b. Used in its principal, intrinsic sense, an animal is "healthy" if it conforms to its nature. A dog may therefore be said to be "healthy." In this sense, "healthy" is a univocal term that refers to conformity with nature. It would be the prime analogate.
A dog's food may also be said to be "healthy," as well as a certain kind of medicine may be said to be "healthy," or a dog's urine may be said to be "healthy." The dog's "healthy" food, its "healthy" medicine, and its "healthy" urine ("healthy" in these instances being secondary analogates) all refer to, and obtain their meaning from, the prime analogate "healthy" as used of the dog. The healthy food is a cause of the healthy dog. The healthy medicine may be the cause of making a sick dog healthy again. The healthy urine is a sign of the healthy dog. The term "healthy" is realized intrinsically in the reference to the healthy dog. But the term food, medicine, and urine receive the term healthy only by extrinsic reference to, or denomination from, the term healthy as used of the dog.
The analogy of attribution is not only used with adjectival qualities or attributions. It is also seen in the relationship between substance and accidents. The accidents relating to substances are said to be, but they are said to be only an an analogous sense because their "to be" relates to the substance of which they are accidents. The accidents would not have a to be were it not that they all refer to the the to be of the substance.
The analogy of attribution may be applied to the relationship between man and God so that terms, univocal as to God as the primary analogate, may be said of man as the secondary analogate analogously by relationship of exemplary (extrinsic formal) cause. So a man may be said to be a "good" man, though strictly speaking, none is good but God alone (Mark 10:18), inasmuch as the term "good" is predicated of man analogously in reference (as extrinsic formal cause of all goodness, including the "good" man) to God, who alone is univocally good. Anderson (1949), 96.
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*It is also less commonly known as analogy of proportion. Anderson (1949), 96.
**Since the relationship of the secondary analogates to the primary analogate is usual causal, it can be a relationship arising from a material cause, formal cause (including exemplary cause, i.e., extrinsic formal cause), efficient cause, or final cause. Anderson (1949), 96.
***St. Thomas, Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7, 535-36.
535. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur.See Anderson (1949), 93-94.
536. Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. Et hoc patet in exemplis infra positis.
535. He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said “to be predicated analogously,” i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.
536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.
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